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OWNING AND DISSOLVING STRATA PROPERTY
DOUGLAS C. HARRIS'

PART I: DISSOLVING TWELVE OAKS
Twelve Oaks is a three-storey, 30-unit strata property complex located near
the general hospital in the City of Vancouver (Figure 1). The residential,
wood-frame building was constructed in 1973 on several lots that had been
occupied by a gas station, a small apartment building, and a house.' The
developer built the complex to sell the individual units, and in 1974 it
finalized the property arrangements with the deposit of Strata Plan VR140
(the "plan") in the land title office (Figure 2). The plan created separate, fee
simple interests in each of 30 strata lots, established the owners of those
strata lots as tenants-in-common of the common property, and allotted
each owner a vote in the strata corporation that governed the complex.
Twelve Oaks was among the early strata property developments in
Vancouver. In 1966, British Columbia had become the first province in
Canada to enact a statute-based template for condominium propertywhen
it passed the Strata Titles Act.2 At first, the template was little used, but by
the early 1970s developers, financers, and purchasers had become
increasingly comfortable with strata property as a legal architecture for
t
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ownership in multi-unit buildings. Twelve Oaks was on the leading edge of
a condominium wave that would sweep across much of the city in the
decades that followed.
In 2017, Twelve Oaks became the first strata corporation under British
Columbia's new strata property dissolution rules to secure a court order
confirming its resolution to cancel the strata plan, wind up the strata
corporation, and establish the strata lot owners as tenants-in-common of all
the property that had been within the strata property development.' The
British Columbia Supreme Court (BCSC) also confirmed the appointment
of a liquidator, the surrender of each owner's co-ownership interest to the
liquidator, and the authority of the liquidator to proceed with the sale of
the property. A purchase agreement with a land developer was already in
place, and it was this agreement that precipitated the vote to dissolve
Twelve Oaks. The developer's $21.5 million offer was almost exactly twice
the cumulative assessed value of the 30 strata lots.'
Once the strata plan is cancelled, the individual lots terminated, and the
owners paid for their fractional shares, the Twelve Oaks building will be
demolished. It is likely that a larger, denser residential strata property
development will arise on its site to take advantage ofmunicipal zoning that
allows for residential high-rise structures.' Given the central location, the
cost of the land, and the opportunity for greater return from an "upscale"
See Douglas C Harris, "Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in
Vancouver" (2011) 36:3 Law & Soc Inquiry 694. British Columbia uses "strata
property" instead of the more widely adopted "condominium" to describe the same
arrangement of land ownership.
See The Owners, StrataPlan VR140 v Harrison (27 March 2017), Vancouver, BCSC
S-1611558 (Court Order) at 2 [Twelve Oaks]. In this paper, I use "dissolution" to
describe the process of cancelling a strata plan, winding up the strata corporation, and
converting individual ownership of separate parcels to tenancies-in-common of
the whole.

6

See The Owners, Strata Plan VRI40 v Harrison (14 December 2016), Vancouver,
BCSC S-1611558 (Petition) at7 [Twelve Oaks Petition].
Under the City of Vancouver, by-law No 3575, Zoning and Development
By-law (14
June 2016), RM-3 District Schedule at 1, Twelve Oaks occupies land that is zoned
RM-3, which is described as follows: "[t]he intent .. . is to permit medium density
residential development, including high-rise apartment buildings".
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development, the new un its, will be marketed at a cost per square foot well
above what it would have cost to acquire a unit in Twelve Oaks. As a result,
a significantly more affluent group of owners than those who owned within
Twelve Oaks will become the members of the next strata corporation.

Figure 1 The main entrance to iwelve Oaks, May 2017. (Photo credit: Ozgecan
Yazar, used with permission.)
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Figure 2 Portions of two sheets from Strata Plan VR140 showing the South
Elevation of the three-storey building and the First Floor layout, including ten
strata lots and common property.
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The vote by the owners to dissolve Twelve Oaks, and thus terminate the
separate fee simple interests in the 30 strata lots, was not unanimous.
Twenty-eight owners (93.3 percent) voted in favour; two were opposed.
Until 2016, this opposition might have doomed the effort to dissolve
Twelve Oaks and make a collective sale. British Columbia's Strata Property
Act (the "Act") required the unanimous consent of owners or a court order
to dissolve strata property.8 However, with a set of amendments in 2015,
which came into force in 2016, the provincial government reduced the
9
dissolution vote threshold to 80 percent of owners. The vote at Twelve
Oaks was comfortably above this reduced threshold, and by the time the
BCSC heard the strata corporation's application to confirm the resolution,
several months after the dissolution vote, nobody appeared in person to
oppose it. One owner who had lived in the building for nearly40 years, who
had recently renovated his unit, and who suffered from a serious illness that
made moving difficult, had voted against the sale, but subsequently resigned
himself to it.'o Another owner objected to the distribution ofproceeds from
the proposed sale and sought a different accounting of the strata lot value,
but did not appear at the hearing to oppose the application." As a result,
the Court did not hear dissenting voices.
British Columbia's StrataPropertyAct requires that strata corporations
containing five or more strata lots secure confirmation of dissolution
resolutions from the BCSC.12 The legislation also provides that "[a]n
owner, a mortgagee of a strata lot, or any other person the Supreme court
considers appropriate" may apply to the BCSC for an order to dissolve

7

See Twelve Oaks Petition, supra note 5 at 7-8.

8

SBC 1998, c 43, s 272(1) [SPA], before amended by the Natural Gas Development
StatutesAmendmentAct, 2015, SBC 2015, c 40 [NaturalGas Act].

9

0

12

See ibid, s 272(1).
See Glen Korstrom, "Court Approves First Condominium Sale under Bill 40", Business
in Vancouver (27 March 2017), online: <www.biv.com>.
The Owners, Strata Plan VR140 v Harrison (2 January 2017), Vancouver, BCSC
S-1611558 (Response to Petition).
SPA, supra note 8, ss 273.1, 278.1.
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strata property even where the 80 percent threshold has not been met." As
a result, the courts will review the dissolution of all strata property, except
those developments with fewer than five units where the owners
unanimously support dissolution.' 4
Moreover, the volume of strata property dissolution applications seems
certain to increase. Just as Twelve Oaks was at the leading edge of
condominium development in Vancouver, it is now at the forefront of the
efforts to dissolve those early associations of owners. Indeed, the day after
the BCSC confirmed the dissolution in Twelve Oaks, it confirmed the
dissolution vote of the Brandywine strata property development in the
Vancouver suburb ofCoquitlam." The circumstances were similar: an aging
building that required extensive and expensive renovation and a developer's
offer substantially above the cumulative assessed value of the individual
strata lots." Support for dissolution among the 58 Brandywine owners
exceeded the 80 percent threshold, but nine owners (15.5 percent) had
voted against it (a significantly larger block than the two who had voted
against dissolution in Twelve Oaks), although none of the owners contested
the application to confirm the vote.
As the proportion of owners within a strata corporation who oppose
dissolution and collective sale grows, so too the likelihood increases that the
courts will hear vigorously contested dissolution applications. Indeed, the
efforts to dissolve two common law condominium developments in Metro
Vancouver led to protracted disputes and extensive litigation between
owners,17 and most recently, the BCSC denied an application to confirm a
13

See ibid, s 284.

4

The owners of strata lots in small strata property developments may still seek out court
confirmation of a dissolution vote, even if there is unanimous consent to dissolve the
strata property.

15

See Re: The Owners, StrataPlan NW 698 In the MatterofSection 278.1 of the Strata
PropertyAct, SBC 1998, c 43 (28 March 2017) Vancouver, BCSC S-171277 (Court
Order) at 1-2.

6

See Glen Korstrom, "Coquitlam Strata Corporation Seeks Dissolution under Bill 40",
Business in Vancouver (14 February 2017), online: <www.biv.com>.

"

See Mowat v Dudas, 2012 BCSC 454, [2012] BCWLD 5292 [Mowat]; McRae
v
Seymour Village Management nc, 2014 BCSC 714, [2014] BCWLD 4545 [McRae].
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dissolution vote in the first contested hearing under the new dissolution
rules.' 8 This case involved another three-storey, wood-frame building,
known as Bel-Aire Villa, only 1.5 kilometres from Twelve Oaks. At the
dissolution vote, 30 of the 36 owners (83.3 percent) voted in favour of
dissolution, and two more indicated their support after the vote.19 One
owner opposed the application to confirm the dissolution vote,
precipitating the first judicial analysis of the amended dissolution rules.
In anticipation of contested attempts to dissolve strata property, British
Columbia's StrataPropertyAct directs the courts to consider certain factors.
Whether asked to confirm a resolution supported by at least 80 percent of
owners, or to order dissolution based on a petition from owners where that
threshold has not been met, the courts are to consider "the best interests of
the owners,"" and the probability and extent of "significant unfairness"2 1to
owners and their creditors or of "significant confusion and uncertainty in
the affairs of the strata corporation or of the owners"22 if the order is
granted or not granted. This is the framework within which the courts
must decide whether or not to approve the dissolution of strata property.
This article does several things. In Part II, it steps back from the details
of the statutory dissolution and collective sale provisions, and from the
particular disputes outlined above to describe what is at stake in the choice
between a dissolution regime that presumes the need for unanimous
consent among owners and one that presumes supermajority approval is
sufficient to dissolve strata property. In brief, the choice between
dissolution regimes is also a choice between protecting the capacity of
For an analysis of these cases see Douglas C Harris & Nicole Gilewicz, "Dissolving
Condominium, Private Takings, and the Nature of Property" in B Hoops et al, eds,

RethinkingExpropriationLaw II: Context, Criteria,and ConsequencesofExpropriation
(The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2015) 263.
"

Re: The Owners, Strata Plan VR 1966 In the Matter of Section 278.1 of the Strata
PropertyAct, SBC 1998, c 43 [Strata Plan VR 1966].

'

Ibid at paras 24-25.

"

Supra note 8, ss 273.1(5)(a), 278.1(5)(a), 284(3)(a).

"

Ibid, ss 273.1(5)(b)(i), 278.1(5)(b)(1), 284(3)(b)(i).
Ibid, ss 273.1(5)(b)(ii), 278.1(5)(b)(ii), 284(3)(b)(ii).

22
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owners to remain owners, or enhancing their ability to maximize the
exchange value of property interests. This choice becomes clear when
nonconsensual dissolution, which results in the termination of individual
property interests, is understood as a taking of property. A regime that
facilitates the capacity of a majority to take the property interests of a
dissenting minority enables strata property owners to maximize the
exchange value of their interests, but at the cost of dispossessing the
minority. Some owners who do not wish to transfer their interests will be
forced to do so. Moreover, while the dissolution vote threshold is a
particularly important determinant of the character of property in a strata
property regime, the courts will also be deciding whether to defend
continuing ownership or to enhance the ability to maximize exchange value
when they decide contested dissolution cases.
Having established that the workings of the dissolution regime involve
basic choices about the nature of strata property, Parts III and IV turn to an
analysis of the role of the courts in the former and current dissolution
regimes in British Columbia. The former dissolution regime, in place
2000-16, required unanimous consent or a court order to dissolve strata
property. The discussion of this regime in Part III is brief, reflecting the fact
that dissolution was difficult and the provisions were lightly used. In Part
IV, the article shifts to the newly adopted rules establishing the 80 percent
threshold for strata property dissolution and to an analysis of the provisions
set out in the Strata Property Act that guide the courts when hearing
contested applications. Although the analysis focuses on British Columbia
and the details of its statute, other jurisdictions with supermajority
thresholds have also inserted a requirement that courts confirm a
supermajority vote to give it effect.23 The courts in those jurisdictions will
be working within different statutory frames, but they will confront the
same basic questions about what the strata property regime is designed to
protect: continuing ownership or investment?
The concluding Part V offers several predictions and prescriptions for
how the courts will and should interpret their role. The predictions are
based on the language in the Strata PropertyAct and an interpretation of
23

See the discussion in Part V, beginning infra note 54.
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the case law. The prescriptions are based on the argument in Part II that
when courts rule in contested dissolution cases, they make basic choices
about whether to protect the capacity of owners to maximize the exchange
value of property or to remain as owners. As a result, the crucial and
preliminary step for the courts when ruling in these cases is to recognize
that fundamental choices about the nature of property ownership and its
social purposes confront them. Then, in making these choices, the courts
must be attentive to the social and economic context in which they are
ruling. The statutory direction to consider "best interests" and the
probability and extent of "significant unfairness" requires this attention. In
recent years, that context includes an unparalleled escalation of property
values in British Columbias urban centres. As a result, many who once
expected to be owners of their homes now find ownership beyond reach,
and this fact has created the perception of crisis in the availability of
affordable housing. The courts must account for this context, but also
recognize that they are shaping it when they choose whether or not to
authorize a taking of property in order to facilitate the maximization of
exchange value over the protection of home.
PART II: OWNING AND DISSOLVING STRATA PROPERTY
When owners within strata property unanimously support dissolution, the
process of breaking apart the constituent elements of strata property
ownership is relatively straightforward, as it eventually proved to be for
Twelve Oaks. Although membership in a strata corporation is a mandatory
feature of strata property ownership, strata property constructs a voluntary
association of owners in the sense that the owners may voluntarily disband
the association. However, when there is no consensus, the statutory
provisions and the courts become particularly important to the outcome.
The successful dissolution of strata property will depend on the required
threshold for consent in the legislation and the willingness of the courts to
order dissolution when some owners are opposed.
Moreover, the legal framework for dissolving strata property impacts
not only individual outcomes or the general likelihood of dissolution, but
also the character of ownership within strata property. A regime that
presumes the need for unanimous consent to dissolve strata property creates
a different conception of ownership and establishes different social
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purposes for ownership than one based on supermajority approval. This
constitutive power to define property and its purposes lies not only in the
statutory provisions, which set the threshold for dissolution votes, but also
in the decisions of the courts to approve or block nonconsensual
dissolution. The courts will determine the circumstances in which
dissolution may proceed, and in doing so, will establish what ownership
protects. This becomes apparent when nonconsensual dissolution is
understood as taking of property.2 4
The deposit of a strata plan, as the constituting document of strata
property, brings the multiple fee simple interests within a strata property
development into existence; the cancellation of that plan-one of the acts
in dissolution-terminates those same fee simple interests. As a result, those
owners who precipitate nonconsensual dissolution are forcing the
termination of fee simple interests in individual strata lots held by other
owners, and thus are stripping property interests from those who oppose
dissolution. In this sense, nonconsensual dissolution enables a form of
"delegated private takings"2 5 or "private-to-private takings"26 in which one
group of owners dissolves a strata property complex and thus terminates the
property interests within it, including those ofnonconsenting owners. This
termination amounts to a taking of property from those who
oppose dissolution.2 7
On dissolution, the former owners of individual strata lots become
tenants-in-common of the property that had been within strata property.
Each holds an undivided share (or fractional interest) of the whole. This
conversion of individual interests into undivided shares of common
property serves as compensation for the loss of individual interests.

24

This argument is developed more fully in Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 17.

2

Abraham Bell, "Private Takings" (2009) 76:2 U Chicago L Rev 517 at 545-48.
Emma JL Waring, "Private-to-Private Takings and the Stability of
Property" (2013)
24:2 King's LJ 237 at 238.
AJ van der Walt, ConstitutionalPropertyClauses:A ComparativeAnalysis
(Cape Town:

26

27

Juta & Co, 1999) at 18, notes that "takings" include the limiting or termination of
property interests and do not also require the acquisition of those interests, as is the case
with other common terms such as "expropriation" or "compulsory acquisitions".
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Moreover, converting individual interests within strata property to coownership interests outside strata property usually maximizes the
compensation that owners receive for the loss of their individual property
interests. This is because the impetus for dissolution is almost always that
the exchange value of the co-ownership interests is greater than that of the
individual interests within the strata property development. This occurs
most commonly in inflating property markets, such as Vancouver's in the
past decade, where rising land values spur redevelopment, but it also occurs
in deflating markets where large inventories of unsold units create pressure
to "deconvert" condominium buildings to rental buildings." Aging
buildings are also susceptible to dissolution because increasing maintenance
and the need for substantial renovations prompt owners to askwhether it is
in their financial interest to incur those costs. Whatever the combination of
pressures, the incentive to dissolve the existing structure of ownership is a
function of the desire to maximize the exchange value of property interests.
As a result, dissolution regimes that enhance the capacity of a majority of
owners to take the property of a minority serve to maximize the exchange
value of property interests for all owners. The fact that all owners maximize
the exchange value of their property does not alter the fact that those who
oppose dissolution suffer an involuntary loss of property.
Justice Milman's decision not to confirm the Bel-Aire Villa strata
property dissolution vote turns on this point. Non-consensual dissolution
of strata property, he concluded, amounts to "an involuntary taking of a

28

This process has been labelled "condominium deconversion" because it commonly
occurs in buildings that were already converted from rental to condominium. The
impetus to deconvert arises when demand for condominium softens (see Deborah
Goonan, "Can Hostile Takeovers of Condominium Associations Be Prevented" (2
January 2017), Independent American Communities (blog), online: <independent
americancommunities.com/2017/01/02/can-hostile-takeovers-of-condominiumassociations-be-prevented) and/or the rental market strengthens (see Gail MarksJarvis,
"Deconverting Condos Feeds Renters' Growing Demand", Chicago Tribune (24 June
2016), online: <www.chicagotribune.com>. See also Antwan D Hampton, Rapid
Regime Responses:An UrbanRegimeAnalysis of Chicago' andMiami'sPolicyResponses to
anEmergingHousingCrisis(PhD Thesis, Northern Illinois University Department of
Political Science, 2013) (ProQuest).
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home."2 9 Where the taking of property is authorized by statute, he
continued, the courts will apply the statutory requirements strictly.3 As a
result, the Bel-Aire Villa strata corporation's failure to provide a statement
estimating the value of the owners' interests following dissolution, as
required under the StrataPropertyAct, invalidated the dissolution vote even
though the absence of the information did not appear to have caused
prejudice.3 ' In short, the process must be unimpeachable, at least when
measured against the statutory requirements, because it results in the taking
of property.
Describing nonconsensual dissolution of strata property as a
private-to-private taking reveals the fundamental nature of the shift in
ownership when a jurisdiction swings, as British Columbia has done, from a
system that presumed the need for unanimous consent to dissolve strata
property to one that presumes supermajority approval is sufficient. The
former protects property by requiring an owner's consent to its transfer; the
latter protects property by ensuring compensation for the loss ofproperty.2
Where dissolution may occur with supermajority approval, individual
property interests within strata property are protected primarily by the
extent to which owners will vote to dissolve strata property (and thus to
terminate individual interests) only if the exchange value of those property
interests is greater after dissolution than it is within strata property. In
short, property interests are protected by a right to compensation, not by

"

Supra note 18 at para 41.

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid at para42.

32

This is the distinction between property rules and liability rules articulated by Guido
Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral" (1972) 85:6 Harv L Rev 1089 at 1106-10. See the
discussion in Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 16 at 284-86. Lawrence Troy et al, "'It
Depends What You Mean by the Term Rights': Strata Termination and Housing Rights"
(2017) 32:1 HousingStudies 1 at 13, describe this as "[a] tension between what is seen
as a legal right to profit from redevelopment and [a) right to be protected from
forced dispossession".
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the capacity of an owner to insist on consent. As Carol Rose suggests, these
different ways of protecting property create different property interests. 33
The prospect of nonconsensual dissolution also raises an even more
3
fundamental question about the social functions of land ownership. 4
Should a property interest in land protect the capacity of owners to remain
owners, or should it protect the opportunity to maximize the exchange
value of land? The choice between these different social roles of property
ownership is most pronounced in the choice between unanimity and
supermajority regimes, but the courts are making similar choices when they
determine the extent to which they will scrutinize, and the circumstances in
which they will confirm or block nonconsensual dissolution.
PART III: UNANIMOUS CONSENT OR A COURT ORDER TO
DISSOLVE STRATA PROPERTY
Until 2015, British Columbia chose to protect the capacity of owners to
continue as owners within strata property through a dissolution regime that
required a unanimous vote to cancel the strata plan, wind up the strata
corporation, and designate the owners as tenants-in-common of all the
private and common land formerly within the strata property
development.35 In doing so, the legislation established a presumption that
owners must consent to the transfer of their property. However, there were

3

Carol M Rose, "Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law"
(2000) 2000:1 Utah L Rev 1 at 10.
On the dichotomy between social functions of property in land, see Carol M Rose,
"'Takings' and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as 'Propriety'" in
CarolM Rose, ed, Propertyand Persuasion:Essayson the History, Theory, andRhetoricof
Ownership(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) 49; Gregory S Alexander, Commodity
Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought 1776-1970
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997); Joseph William Singer, "The
Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, andjust Obligations"
(2006) 30:2 Harv Envol L Rev 309.

*

See the British Columbia Law Institute, Report on TerminatingaStrata,BCLI Report
No 79 (Vancouver: BCLI, 2015) at 9-36 [BCLI, TerminatingaStrata],on the history
of strata property dissolution regimes in British Columbia and the details of the regime
in place from 2000-16.

&
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two options for those owners who sought dissolution where unanimity
among owners proved elusive.
First, on the strength of a 75 percent vote, a strata corporation might
apply to the BCSC for an order that a vote requiring unanimous consent
"proceed as if the dissenting voter or voters had no vote."" In short, the
courts could (and still can) deem a non-unanimous vote to be unanimous
"ifsatisfied that the passage of the resolution is in the best interests of the
strata corporation and would not unfairly prejudice the dissentingvoter or
voters"37 and if those opposed amount to less than 5 percent of eligible
voters.38 The only reported case under this provision involved a 21-unit
strata property development in which one owner had not voted and,
although not opposed to the 20 owners who had voted to dissolve the strata
property, simply took no position.39 As a result, the case did not require the
court to develop an analysis of best interests or unfair prejudice, and the
reasons for decision provide little guidance about the willingness of courts
to deem a non-unanimous vote to be unanimous where some owners are
opposed. The absence of other reported decisions suggests the provision
was little used.
Alternatively, any owner could apply to the BCSC for an order to wind
up the strata corporation and appoint a liquidator to sell the property."
These applications, made by owners rather than by a strata corporation on
behalf of owners, did not require a minimum threshold. In these instances,
the StrataPropertyAct instructed the courts to ask if"the winding up would
be in the best interests of the owners, registered charge holders and other
creditors."" In determining "best interests" the legislation directed the

36

SPA, supra note 8, s 52(3).

3

Ibid.

3

Ibid, s 52(2).

3

See The Owners, Strata Plan NW422 v. Khlybov, 2016 BCSC 285 at para 4, [2016]

BCWLD 1870.
4

See SPA, supra note 8, s 284, before amended by the NaturalGasAct, supra note 8.

41

Ibid, s 284(2).
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courts to consider "the scheme and intent"4 1 of the Strata PropertyAct,"the
probability of unfairness to one or more owners, registered charge holders
4
or other creditors, if winding up is not ordered", and "the probability of
confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the strata corporation or the
owners if winding up is not ordered.""
The only reported judicial consideration of these provisions appears in
Buchanan v S.R VR 1411,45 a case involving a triplex development in
Vancouver in which two owners sought to dissolve the strata corporation
over the objections of the third. A lack of agreement about the need for
renovations and the allocation of renovation expenses had led the owners to
court on multiple occasions. On the dissolution application,Justice Curtis
found that not granting the order would be unfair to the two owners who
sought the order (and probably to the owner who opposed the order)"
because "the cost of repairs ... will likely significantly exceed the associated
increase in value ", and because none of the owners appeared to have the
funds to cover those costs.4 Justice Curtis also determined "that the
probability of confusion and uncertainty if winding up is not ordered very
49
significantly exceeds the probable extent of those factors if it is." He
described the strata property as "dysfunctional both on a structural and
organizational level"," and seemed to think there was little prospect that the
parties could resolve this dysfunction ifconsigned to remain owners within
the strata corporation. However, he withheld the dissolution order to allow

4

Ibid, 284(3)(a).

43

Ibid, 284(3)(b).

-

Ibid, 284(3)(c).

4

2008 BCSC 977, [2009] BCWLD 1507 [Buchanan].

4

See ibid at para 38.

1

Ibid at para 34.

48

See ibid at para 36.

'

Ibid at para 38.

"o

Ibid at para 37.
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the parties "to contemplate the possibilities as there may be better ways to
realize their respective interests.""
While Buchanan provides an example of the application of the
dissolution rules, it offers little general guidance for interpreting the
provisions. The fact that it is the only reported case under a regime that
required either unanimous consent among strata lot owners or a court order
to dissolve a strata property development may indicate just how difficult
this regime made it to dissolve strata property. That difficulty was certainly
part of the impetus for the province's shift to a supermajority regime. 52
PART IV: SUPERMAJORITY APPROVAL AND A COURT
ORDER TO DISSOLVE STRATA PROPERTY
Beginning in 2016, a strata corporation in British Columbia may seek to
dissolve strata property with the support of as few as 80 percent of the
owners." In shifting from a regime that presumed the need for unanimous
consent to dissolve strata property, to one that presumes the sufficiency of
supermajority approval, British Columbia followed other statutory
condominium jurisdictions that have made a similar change.51 Still other
jurisdictions are studying or in varying stages of implementing strata
property dissolution based on supermajority approval.,, The Australian
"

Ibidat para39.

52

See the recommendations in BCLI, TerminatingaStrata, supra
note 35 at 51-55.
See SPA, supra note 8, as amended by Natural Gas Act, supra note 8, ss 37-55. The

1

amendments came into force 28 July 2016 (BC Reg 206/2016).
*

Singapore introduced supermajority thresholds of 80 or 90 percent, depending on the
age of the building, in 1999. See Land Titles (Strata)(Amendment)Actl 999 (No 21 of
1999, Sing), s 8; Kah LengTer, "AMan's Home is [Not] His Castle-EnBlocCollective
Sales in Singapore" (2008) 20:1 Sing Ac LJ 49; Teo Keang Sood, "Collective Sales in
Singapore" (2010) 22 Sing Ac LJ 66. Florida adopted an 80 percent threshold in 2007.
See Fla Stat tit XL § 718.117 (2007). See the overview of Canadian approaches in
BCLI, Terminatinga Strata, supra note 35 at 37-40. Cornelius Van Der Merwe, ed,
European Condominium Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at
525-26, 531-32, surveys the range of approaches in Europe.
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state of New South Wales, which created the strata property model that
British Columbia emulated fifty years ago, has just introduced a75 percent
"strata renewal" threshold. 5 In the United States, the Uniform Law
Commission's Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act recommends
that states adopt an 80 percent threshold, although it also suggests that
residential common interest communities, including condominium
developments, have the option of raising that threshold. 5
The dissolution regimes that presume the sufficiency of supermajority
approval make the nonconsensual dissolution of strata property, and thus
the taking of property from those who oppose dissolution, more likely.
Perhaps in recognition of the inherent dangers to the security of tenure that
accompany the capacity of a majority to terminate the property interests of
an unwilling minority, the amendments to British Columbia's Strata
Property Act include a requirement that strata corporations with five or
more strata lots secure confirmation from the BCSC of resolutions to
dissolve strata property." The possibility also remains for individual owners
to apply to the BCSC for an order to wind up a strata corporation even

Property Law Review: Options Paper Recommendations Body Corporate Governance
Issues: By-laws, Debt Recovery and Scheme Termination by William Duncan et al
(Brisbane: Commercial and Property Law Research Centre, 2017) at 55-83; Western
Australian Land Information Authority, "Safeguards for the Termination of Schemes"
(11 May 2017), online: <wwwO.landgate.wa.gov.au/titles-and-surveys/strata-reform
/termination-of-schemes>.
6

5

See StrataSchemes DevelopmentAct 2015 (NSW), Part 10 ("Strata Renewal Process for
Freehold Strata Schemes") [SSDA 2015]. Section 154 defines the "required level of
support" for strata renewal as "the owner or owners of at least 75% of the lots" (ibid).

US, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Unform Common
Interest Ownership Act (Big Sky: Uniform Law Commission, 2008) at 100:
Section 2-118....
(a) ... a common interest community may be terminated only by agreement of unit owners of
units to which at least 80 percent of the votes in the association are allocated, or any larger
percentage the declaration specifies, and with any other approvals required by the declaration.
The declaration may specify a smaller percentage only if all of the units are restricted exclusively
to non-residential uses.
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without an 80 percent vote in favour of dissolution.5 ' As a result, it is only
those strata property developments with fewer than five strata lots where all
owners support dissolution that will not require judicial scrutiny. The
dissolution of all other strata property will come before the courts. This
means that the manner in which the courts interpret and fulfill their role
will have a significant impact on the extent of nonconsensual dissolution
and the circumstances in which it proceeds.
In British Columbia, whether hearing a request from a strata
corporation to confirm a dissolution vote of at least 80 percent of owners,
or a petition from individual owners for an order to dissolve strata property,
the StrataPropertyAct directs the courts to consider the following factors:
* "the best interests of the owners";
* the probability and extent of "significant unfairness to one or
more" owners, registered charge holders, or, in the case of the
appointment of a liquidator, other creditors; and
*
the probability and extent of "significant confusion and
uncertainty in the affairs of the strata corporation or of
the owners."6
These factors are similar to those that the courts were to consider when
hearing applications to dissolve strata property under the former regime,
but the structure of the instructions is different. Instead of analyzing
"unfairness" and "confusion and uncertainty" as elements within an analysis
of best interests, the amended Act lists each of these factors as a
separate consideration.
Ibid, s 284.
6o
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The analysis that follows focuses on British Columbia, but several other jurisdictions
with supermajority thresholds also require court confirmation of the dissolution vote. In
New South Wales, a strata renewal plan lapses if an owners corporation does not apply
to court for an order to give effect to the plan. See SSDA 2015, supra note 56, s 177.
Supra note 8, ss 273.1(5), 278.1(5), 284(3). The principal difference
between these
provisions is that sections 278.1 and 284 direct the courts to consider the probability
and extent of significant unfairness to "(C) other creditors" as well as "(A) owners" and
"(B) holders of registered charges" when considering an order to dissolve coupled with
the appointment of a liquidator with the authority to sell the assets formerly within
strata property (ibid).
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BEST INTERESTS OF THE OWNERS

How are the courts to interpret the directive to consider "the best interests
of the owners" in a dissolution hearing? The StrataPropertyAct does not
provide additional guidance, but the courts have used "best interests" to
guide their decision-making when ruling on disputes involving a strata
corporation's responsibility "for managing and maintaining the common
property and common assets of the strata corporation for the benefit of the
owners."" Where the interests of owners align, this responsibility is
relatively straightforward, but when they diverge, a strata corporation will
make decisions that benefit some owners and disadvantage others. In Gentis
v The Owners, Strata Plan VR 368,63 a case involving a dispute between
owners over the use of common property, the BCSC ruled that strata
corporations "must consider, and act in, the best interests of all the
owners."" In doing so, it cited an earlier statement from the BCSC in
Sterloffv Strata Plan VR 261365 that strata corporations "must endeavour
to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number" when managing
common property.66 In these passages, the courts recognize that the "best
interests of all the owners" may not be in the best interests of each
individual owner and, where interests conflict, that the strata corporation
should act in the collective best interest.
The focus on collective best interest arises from cases dealing with the
responsibility of strata corporations for common property. They present
significantly different scenarios than strata property dissolution, which
involves acting on, and indeed terminating, private interests in individual
strata lots. As a result, although the goal articulated in Sterloffof achieving
the "greatest good for the greatest number" is relevant in assessing the
content of "the best interests of the owners", and a supermajority in favour
of dissolution is compelling evidence of the collective good, it is not likely
62

Ibid, s 3.

6

2003 BCSC 120, [2003] BCWLD 307 [Gentis].

*

Ibidatpara24.

6

[1994] BCWLD 813, 1994 CanLII 1011 [Sterlof].

66

Ibid at 11.
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determinative. Nor should it be. When considering the decision of a
majority to terminate the property interests of everyone, including a
nonconsenting minority, the courts should consider individual as well as
collective best interests.
A similar caution applies when assessing the relevance of the judicial
interpretation of "best interests" in that part of the Strata Property Act
dealing with the duties of strata council members. The members of strata
councils (the elected officers of strata corporations) must "act honestly and
in good faith with a view to the best interests of the strata corporation".'"
This statutory duty of care, which mirrors that of corporate directors and
officers set out in the CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct,"protects the best
interests of strata corporations as separate entities rather than the interests
of the owners themselves. Moreover, it targets strata council members who
act for the strata corporation, but to further their personal interests to the
detriment of the strata corporation." As a result, the judicial consideration
of "best interests" in these cases focuses on the conflicts of interest that
cause strata council members to displace the collective interest with their
individual interests. In this context, the courts reiterate that the interests of
the strata corporation, as a separate entity, cannot be ignored.
The existing interpretations of "best interests" focus on the uses of
common property or on the strata corporation as an independent entity. In
both these circumstances, the courts interpret "best interests" in a manner
that protects the collective good. This is entirely appropriate in these
contexts, and the collective good is certainly a relevant consideration in the
dissolution of strata property. Moreover, it seems likely that a dissolution
vote which achieves the 80 percent threshold will place the principal
burden of establishing that it is not in the best interests of the owners to
proceed with dissolution on those opposed to dissolution. Conversely, in
circumstances where the 80 percent threshold has not been met, those
seeking dissolution will bear the principal burden ofestablishing that it is in
67
6

69

SPA, supra note 8, s 31.

RSC 1985, c C-44, s 122(1)(a).
See Dockside Brewing Co Ltd v Strata Plan LMS 3837, 2007 BCCA 183, [2007]
BCWLD 5254.

2017

STRATA PROPERTY

955

the best interest of the owners to cancel the strata plan, terminate the
property interests, and wind up the strata corporation. In either case, the
burden will be substantial.
However, the analysis of "best interests" should not be reduced to
collective best interests when it comes to non-consensual dissolution and
the involuntary loss of individual interests inland. Put another way, the fact
that a strata corporation has met the 80 percent threshold and that a
supermajority of owners supports dissolution should not be determinative
of best interests. In this context, the owners are asking the courts not just to
resolve a dispute about the uses of common property, but to condone the
taking of property interests from a minority of owners who oppose
dissolution. The taking ofindividual property interests requires attention to
individual circumstances and to the particular disadvantage that the loss of
property might cause. Extreme disadvantage to a minority because of the
involuntary loss of property could well be grounds for a court to deny
confirmation of a dissolution resolution because it was not in the "best
interests of the owners", even where a supermajority of owners was
in support.
B.

SIGNIFICANT UNFAIRNESS

That courts should extend their analysis beyond the collective interests of
strata property owners and focus attention on individual owners is even
clearer in the statutory direction that they consider the probability of
"significant unfairness to one or more (A) owners, or (B) holders of
registered charges"o when reviewing dissolution applications. Where a
liquidator is retained to facilitate the sale of the a property, the legislation
also directs the courts to consider significant unfairness to a third category
of interested parties: "(C) other creditors".71 These provisions instruct the
courts specifically to consider individuals, not just the collective, and they
raise the possibility that significant unfairness to a single owner, charge
holder, or creditor may warrant a decision either to order, or not to
order, dissolution.
70

SPA, supra note 8, s 273.1(5)(b)(i).
Ibid, ss 278.1(5)(b)(i), 284(3)(b)(i).
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The Act provides little additional guidance to the courts on how to
interpret significant unfairness, but the judicial interpretation of a similar
phrase elsewhere in the Act is relevant. In particular, owners or tenants may
apply to the BCSC to prevent or to remedy actions of a strata corporation
that are "significantly unfair".7 This provision creates a standard against
which to measure the behaviour of strata corporations and, by doing so,
protects individuals and their interests from acts in breach of that standard.
In fact, the capacity to seek remedies for actions that are significantly unfair
serves as the principal protection for individual owners against the
inappropriate use of majoritarian power within strata property.
The courts have elaborated on the "significantly unfair" standard in a
series of cases, including Reid v The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2503,"7 a
dispute involving a complaint from one owner that the actions of the strata
corporation in permitting another owner to use the common propertywere
significantly unfair. In its reasons for decision, the BCSC described
"significantly unfair" as encompassing an action that is "burdensome, harsh,
wrongful, lacking in probity or fair dealing, has been done in bad faith,
and/or has been unjust and inequitable."7 1 Similarly, in Gentis the BCSC
denied a remedy on the grounds that a strata corporation was entitled use
its discretion to make decisions that affected owners, and that courts should
"only interfere with the use of this discretion if it is exercised oppressively, as
defined above, or in a fashion that transcends beyond mere prejudice or
trifling unfairness."S The British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA), in
upholding the decision of the trial court in Reid,76 cited Gentis with
approval: "the common usage of the word 'significant'indicates that a court
should not interfere with the actions of a strata council unless the actions

72

See ibid, s 164. A complaint under s 164 would now proceed to the
Civil Resolution
Tribunal, not the BCSC. See the Civil Resolution TribunalAct, SBC 2012, c 25, s 3.6.
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result in something more than mere prejudice or trifling unfairness."n7 In
short, unfairness must be substantial, not trivial.
This threshold for unfairness suggests that the question ofwho bears the
burden of establishing "significant unfairness" will be crucial to the
outcomes of individual cases. The standard is far from precise, but it is clear
the courts will expect evidence demonstrating more than mere or
inconsequential unfairness.
The courts could use the 80 percent threshold to allocate the burden of
establishing significant unfairness. If so, then the burden would fall to those
who opposed dissolution where the threshold had been met, and to those in
support where it had not. However, the supermajority threshold seems a less
obvious tipping point for the burden of proofwhen the issue is "significant
unfairness" than when it is "best interests". In fact, the courts might
reasonably start with a presumption that the involuntary loss of property,
which is part of nonconsensual dissolution, creates significant unfairness to
those nonconsenting owners. Under this approach, those pushing for
dissolution should expect to present evidence that it would be significantly
unfair not to proceed with dissolution. Indeed, some weighing of respective
unfairness seems inevitable regardless of whether the 80 percent threshold
has been met. It also seems clear that the weight or degree ofthe burden will
depend on the extent of support for dissolution, but that burden will not
flip entirely from those in support of dissolution to those opposed at the 80
percent threshold. At a minimum, the burden of demonstrating significant
unfairness will be shared.
The courts have also grappled with the question ofwhether they should
limit themselves to a review of processes and procedures, or whether they
should also consider the fairness of substantive outcomes. In Peace v The
Owners, Strata Plan VIS 2165,7 a dispute involving the allocation of

renovation expenses, the BCSC ruled that "the focus of [section 164] is on
the conduct of the Strata Corporation and not on the consequences of the
conduct",7 and that "ifthe decision is made in good faith and on reasonable
'

Reid v StrataPlan LMS2503, 2003 BCCA 126 at para 27, [2003] BCJ No 417.
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grounds, there is little room for a finding of significant unfairness merely
because the decision adversely affects some owners to the benefit of
others."so However, the BCCA rejected this approach in Dollan v The
Owners, StrataPlanBCS 1589" when it granted a remedy to the plaintiff
who alleged significant unfairness over the decision of a strata corporation
not to replace a window: "The view that significantly unfair decisions
reached through a fair process are insulated from judicial intervention
would rob the section of any meaningful purpose.""
Turning back to the nonconsensual dissolution of strata property, the
courts might, following the reasoning in Peace, limit their scrutiny of
unfairness to the processes and procedures of the strata corporation in the
dissolution vote. If so, the courts would ask whether the strata corporation
had acted reasonably and, fairly in conducting the vote, and would
scrutinize the process for evidence of coercion, intimidation, deception, or
conflicts of interest." However, they would not scrutinize the outcomes for
unfairness. The justification for this approach rests on an argument that
British Columbia, in reducing the threshold for strata property dissolution
from unanimous consent to supermajority approval, has established the
threshold to dissolve strata property. Once that threshold is met, then the
owners seeking dissolution should be permitted to proceed. The role of the
courts is to review the fairness of the decision-making processes, not the
substantive outcomes.
The role of the courts in reviewing the legitimacy and fairness of the
process in strata property dissolution is undeniably important. Moreover,
under accepted principles of statutory interpretation, the courts should
require strata corporations to comply strictly with the statutory
requirements because the nonconsensual dissolution of strata property

80
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involves the taking of property from dissenting owners. Indeed, in
rejecting the argument in the Bel-Aire Villa litigation that the rule of strict
construction should not apply to the statutory provisions authorizing the
nonconsensual dissolution of strata property, Justice Milman wrote:
While I agree that the application of the rule calling for a strict
construction of expropriation statutes must be sensitive to the context, and
in this case one must account for the shared ownership regime and the
strong majority support for the winding-up resolution demonstrated by the
vote, that context does not change the fact that this is still an involuntary
taking of a home. It must, at a minimum, be done according to law."
This is an important statement connecting nonconsensual dissolution to
the taking of property and then with the common law principle that the
statutes which authorize a taking of property should be interpreted strictly.
The rule of strict construction follows from the recognition of nonconsensual dissolution as a taking."

8

See Eric CE Todd, The Law ofExpropriationand Compensation in Canada, 2 "d Ed.
(Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1992), 29-31; Pierre-Andrd C6td, Interpretation of
Legislation in Canada(Toronto: Carswell, 2011), 511; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the
ConstructionofStatutes, 6h Ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2014), 500-04. See also
the dissenting opinion ofJustice L'Hereux-Dub6 in Leiriaov Val-Bilair(Town), [1991]
3 SCR 349, at 357: "Because property is a fundamental legal right, and because
expropriation is such an exorbitant power, Canadian law has consistently favoured a
restrictive interpretation ofstatutes enabling expropriation." One of the clearest statements
of the underlying principle animating the rule that statutes authorizing the taking of
property must be strictly construed appears in the decision of ChiefJustice Fitzpatrick
in Riopelle v The City ofMontreal, (1911) 44 SCR 579, at 582-83:
When the law invests a person with authority to do an act which, if done without express legal
sanction, would be an offence, the conditions subject to which the act is authorized must be
complied with literally. In other words, where the legislature has thought fit to direct the doing
of something which but for that direction or authority would be an actionable wrong it is
incumbent on the party who professes to exercise the power conferred by the statute to prove
beyond all doubt that he strictly complied with the conditions subject to which the power has
been conferred.
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However, the importance of process and of strict compliance with the
statutory requirements for the dissolution of strata property should not
preclude judicial analysis of substantive outcomes. The courts have rejected
limiting themselves to an analysis of process when reviewing the actions of
strata corporations for unfairness in other contexts, and they should reject it
when considering the contested dissolution of strata property. A
scrupulously fair and transparent process which complies with the Strata
PropertyAct and that leads to a supermajority vote in favour of dissolution
should not immunize the result from review. The courts should also inquire
into the probability and extent of significant unfairness in the outcome,
particularly because they are being asked to sanction the attempt by a
majority of owners to dispossess a minority of their interests in land. If
anything, the moment at which an individual is threatened with the
involuntary loss of property demands not only heightened judicial scrutiny
of process, but also of outcomes.
Moreover, it is not just the involuntary loss ofproperty that is at stake in
strata property dissolution cases, but also the nature of ownership itself.
Courts are determining the circumstances in which strata property may be
taken without consent, and thus the conditions in which property interests
in land are protected only by the right to compensation for their loss. As a
result, when deliberating about whether to confirm this private-to-private
taking, courts should consider the possibility of significant unfairness in
outcomes, not just processes.
To extend the analysis to outcomes as well as process does not mean that
courts should never confirm a supermajority resolution to dissolve strata
property, or that they should never grant a dissolution order in
circumstances where the supermajority threshold has not been achieved.
The courts should ask whether it is significantly unfair that a majority of
owners dispossess a minority, but they may also need to ask whether it
would cause significant unfairness for a minority to force uneconomical

approach of courts in Singapore: "Having regard to the policy objective ofthe collective
sale scheme to facilitate en bloc sales, the courts will not allow what is a truly technical
breach of the LTSA which causes no prejudice to the minority unit owners to frustrate
the wishes of the majority unit owners who wish to obtain a collective sale order."
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renovations on the majority, or for a majority of owners to be deprived a
developer's premium by a minority that refuses to sell. The possibilityofan
outcome that creates significant unfairness does not apply only to those
who might be dispossessed involuntarily.
However, the degrees of potential unfairness are not equivalent in these
scenarios. The first-the involuntary termination of ownership, and
commonly the loss of home-presents a different order of potential
unfairness than that which prevents owners from maximizing the exchange
value of their property interests. This claim that the loss of property,
particularly residential property, deserves heightened scrutiny from the
courts rests on a judgment that property in land may have value that cannot
be captured only in its exchange value. The metaphor of house or home as
castle has strong purchase in the common law,17 and the fact that this
imagery has transcended the legal realm reflects broad cultural recognition
of the particular importance of home. The home as castle was never
impenetrable, and the courts have indicated a particular need to re-think
the maxim in the context of strata property homes." Nonetheless, "home"
still evinces a resonant claim to permanence, or at least supports an
expectation that owners must consent to the transfer of property that is
home. Justice Milman invoked this expectation in his Bel-Aire Villa
decision when he used "home", instead of "strata lot" or "fee simple" or some
other more legally precise and less emotive term, to describe the property
that the majority of owners were proposing to take from the dissenting
minority." Of course, an owner's consent to the transfer of an interest in
"

8

*

See D Benjamin Barros, "Home as a Legal Concept" (2005-2006) 46 Santa Clara L Rev
255, for a general discussion of the legal salience of "home"; Anneke Smit, "Making up
for the Loss of 'Home': Compensation in Residential Property Expropriation" in
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land is not always required. Expropriation legislation permits the
compulsory acquisition of property in land," but most commonly the
taking of private interests in land is done by a public entity for a public
purpose.9' In the nonconsensual dissolution of strata property, owners are
taking property from other owners.
Moreover, until British Columbia amended its strata property
legislation in 2015, strata property owners acquired their strata lots under a
legislative framework that established a presumption that the dissolution of
strata property required unanimous consent. When the province changed
the dissolution threshold to supermajority approval, it upended existing
expectations that the termination of a strata property interest required an
owner's consent. In fact, the province introduced a fundamental change to
the nature of strata property when it displaced the need for consent with a
right to compensation as the principal protection for individual strata lots.
In the immediate aftermath of this legislative change, when the newly
reduced dissolution threshold is likely to produce a spike in attempts to
dissolve strata property, courts should be attuned to claims of significant
unfairness by those who face involuntary loss ofproperty. In particular, the
courts must reject the argument that strata property owners somehow
consented to the possibility that they could be dispossessed by other owners
on the strength of a supermajority vote. The claim that nonconsensual
dissolution is part of the strata property package may become more
persuasive over time, but hundreds of thousands of existing strata property
owners in British Columbia acquired their interests on the basis of a
reasonable expectation that dissolution required their consent. This should
bear on the judicial interpretation of "significant unfairness".
*

See ExpropriationAct, RSBC 1996, c 125.
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SIGNIFICANT CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY

Finally, the Strata Property Act directs the courts to consider "the
probability and extent, if the winding-up resolution is confirmed or not
confirmed, of. .. significant confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the
strata corporation or of the owners." Unlike the directives regarding"best
interests" and "significant unfairness", which focus on owners, this provision
requires the courts to consider the impact on the strata corporation. As an
independent entity, the strata corporation represents the collective interests
of the owners. This may suggest that the questions of confusion or
uncertainty are primarily a collective concern, although where there is an
order to dissolve strata property, the structure for collective decision
making-the strata corporation-disappears and any concern for confusion
or uncertainty must then focus on the owners.
There is not an equivalent to "significant confusion or uncertainty"
elsewhere in the Strata PropertyAct, and thus no related body ofcase law on
which to draw. The judicial interpretation of "significantly" in relation to
"significantly unfair" seems applicable to "significant" as it modifies
confusion or uncertainty; trifling confusion or uncertainty should not
concern the courts. Beyond that, there is little guidance in the existing case
law. In Buchanan, the one case under the prior regime to consider a courtordered dissolution, the Court declined to grant the order even though it
acknowledged that requiring the owners to continue together was almost
certain to produce a great deal more confusion and uncertainty than
dissolving the strata property.93 Perhaps most importantly, the direction to
consider confusion or uncertainty requires a court to address the
consequences of its decision, not just the process.
PART V: OWNING AND DISSOLVING STRATA PROPERTY IN
THE CITY
The decision to dissolve strata property, and thus to cancel a strata plan, to
convert the owners of separate fee simple interests into tenants-in-common
92
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of all the property formerly within strata property, and to wind-up the
strata corporation, is perhaps the single most important decision in the
lifecycle of a strata property development.9' It is a crucial moment for
individual owners as they contemplate the termination of fee simple
interests and, for many, the selling of homes. Moreover, in cities such as
Vancouver, which are grappling with rapidly escalating land prices,
development pressures, and an aging stock ofstrata property developments,
this moment of decision will become increasingly common. When built,
Twelve Oaks was at the leading edge of strata property development in
Vancouver; a little more than 40 years later, its demise is a harbinger of
many strata property dissolutions to come.
The 2015 amendments to British Columbias StrataPropertyActrequire
the courts to be involved in almost all strata property dissolutions, either to
confirm the resolution of a strata corporation to dissolve with the support
of at least 80 percent of the owners, or to order dissolution based on a
petition from one or more owners. How the courts interpret their role
when confronted with contested applications to dissolve strata property will
be crucial to the outcomes of individual cases, but also to the character of
strata property and its social purposes. Moreover, the understanding of
what it means to be an owner of an interest in land, including land outside
strata property, will be shaped increasingly by the rapidly proliferating
architecture of ownership. Here I gather together several predictions and
prescriptions from the preceding section. The predictions are founded on
an interpretation of the statutory provisions and the small body of existing
case law; the prescriptions are based on recognition of the constitutive
power of the courts to shape the nature of ownership and its social
functions when ruling in contested strata property dissolution cases. For the
most part, the predictions and prescriptions align.
First, the 2015 amendments establish a presumption in British
Columbia that 80 percent of owners may precipitate the dissolution and
collective sale of strata property. This presumption will strengthen as
support for dissolution approaches unanimity. However, the supermajority
'
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vote only establishes a presumption. The statutory direction that courts
consider "best interests", "significant unfairness", and "significant confusion
or uncertainty" creates space for those who are opposed to dissolution to
rebut the presumption in favour of dissolution. Similarly, the legislation
enables those seeking dissolution to rebut a presumption against dissolution
where the supermajority threshold has not been achieved. The weight of
the burden will shift with the degree of support for dissolution, but it will
never lie entirely with one side or the other. The courts will expect
arguments and evidence from both sides of contested strata property
dissolutions in relation to best interests, significant unfairness, and
confusion or uncertainty. Moreover, the burden to rebut the presumption
in favour of dissolution should not be thought to be insurmountable,
particularly when the vote is at, or just above, the 80 percent threshold. As
the proportion of those opposed to dissolution approaches 20 percent, the
courts will have to grapple with the fact that to confirm a dissolution vote is
to condone the involuntary taking of property from a substantial,
dissenting minority.
Second, fair processes and procedures leading to a dissolution vote are
essential, and a strata corporation must expect to defend the legitimacy and
integrity of a vote in favour of dissolution in order to demonstrate that the
process has not created "significant unfairness". The BCSC has indicated
already that because the Strata Property Act authorizes the taking of
property, the statutory requirements will be construed strictly.95 But even
strict compliance with the Act and scrupulous attention to process will not
immunize a dissolution vote from broader considerations of unfairness. The
courts will also consider whether nonconsensual dissolution causes
significant unfairness in its outcomes. In most cases, the analysis of
outcomes will focus on the dissenting minoritywho are threatened with the
involuntary loss of property. However, the courts may also consider
whether a decision not to confirm dissolution causes significant unfairness
to those who support it. Nonetheless, the courts will be particularly
attentive to the potential unfairness for those who oppose dissolution. A
decision to confirm nonconsensual dissolution, and thus to condone the
"

Supra note 18 at para 41.
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private-to-private taking of property, requires greater sensitivity to
unfairness than a decision to refuse dissolution, and thus to prevent owners
from maximizing the value of property interests.
Third, the courts should be particularly sensitive to the possibility of
significant unfairness in the wave of nonconsensual dissolution votes that
are likely to follow the implementation of the supermajority threshold in
2016. Until British Columbia amended the Strata Property Act in 2015,
strata property owners acquired their interests with a reasonable
expectation that the dissolution of strata property required their consent.
The shift to a presumption that supermajority approval is sufficient is also a
shift, as I have argued here, in the nature of ownership. For many owners,
particularly homeowners, it may be a destabilizing shift that undermines
existing expectations of permanency, or at least of the right to insist on
consent to the transfer of a property interest. Concerns about the unfairness
caused by this shift to nonconsensual dissolution will dissipate over time as
it becomes reasonable to expect that strata property owners have consented
to the possibility that a supermajority of owners may precipitate the
dissolution of strata property. In the meantime, this regime change, and its
impact on ownership, should be part of any analysis of unfairness.
Finally, the social and urban context of the attempts to precipitate
nonconsensual dissolution matters. When evaluating best interests and
significant unfairness, the courts should pay attention to this broader
context in which they are deciding whether to confirm the involuntaryloss
of property or to sustain an association of owners within strata property. It
is only with attention to this context that the courts will be able to evaluate
best interests and determine whether proceeding or not proceeding with
the nonconsensual dissolution of strata property creates significant
unfairness in the outcome.
This final point about the importance of the social and urban context
may be more prescription than prediction, although context played an
important role in the judicial consideration of two contested attempts to
dissolve common law condominium developments.96 In each case, a group
96

See Mowat, supra note 17; McRae, supra note 17; the discussion in Harris
& Gilewicz,
supra note 17.
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of owners sought an order from the courts under the PartitionofProperty
Act 97 to partition and sell co-owned property in order to take advantage of a
developer's offer that was substantially above the cumulative assessed value
of the individual lots. The dissolution provisions in the StrataPropertyAct
were not at issue, but the lines of conflict between the owners were the
same. Those who sought dissolution were seeking to maximize the exchange
value of their interests through collective sale; those who opposed it sought
to remain owners within the common law condominium and to retain their
homes. In Mowat, the BCSC denied a substantial minority its petition for
partition and sale;9' in McRae, the court granted the order on a similar
petition from 92 percent of owners.99 In both, the courts heard extensive
evidence from the opposing parties,100 and in Mowat the Court indicated
that the evidence it heard from those opposing dissolution about the local
housing market, and the difficulty of re-entering it if they were forced out,
was a crucial element in the decision.'o In brief, the social and urban
context mattered.
It should matter. A strata property dissolution regime, constructed
through legislation and case law, is the outcome of choices-whether
consciously made or not-about the nature of property and its social

9'

RSBC 1996, c 347.

98

See supra note 17 at paras 191-92.

9

See supra note 17 at paras 41, 57.
"

Summarized in Mowat, supranote 17 at paras 19-26, 61-94; McRae, supra note 17 at
paras 21-39.

.o. See Mowat, supra note 17 at paras 162, 167:
I am satisfied that the evidence presented by the respondents establishes that a substantial
number of residents at Cypress Gardens would be unable to purchase comparable replacement
homes on the North Shore for the amount of money they would likely realize from a
court-ordered sale. Moreover, many of the respondents would not be able to finance the
additional cost ofpurchasing replacement accommodation, with the result that they would lose
their homes and be forced either to rent or to move to a different municipality, far from their
work, their friends, and their children's schools.

(ibid at para 167).
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purposes.' 02 A regime that facilitates nonconsensual dissolution, and thus
the private-to-private takings of interests in land, protects property through
a right to compensation if it is taken, not a right to consent to its transfer.
Such a regime better enables owners to maximize the exchange value of
their property, but it does so at the cost of the right to remain secure as an
owner. The result is to construct property in land more as commodity for
investment than, in the case of residential property, as home.
The choice to enhance value over the capacity to remain an owner
affects individual owners, but it also shapes the social and physical fabric of
the city. Indeed, Troy et al suggest "the struggle between exchange value and
use value . .. for strata owners facing renewal may well become one of the
defining issues for the next few decades of urban change",0 3 and at least in a
city such as Vancouver where, according to the 2016 census data, strata
property provides the legal architecture of ownership for one third of
04
households,o'
I think they are right. The rules governing the dissolution of
strata property will shape the city.
The courts will be contributing to these rules, and thus to the shaping of
property and the urban landscape, when they decide contested strata
property dissolution cases. At a minimum, they need to recognize the
constitutive power of their decisions in constructing the institution of
102

See Cathy Sherry, "Termination of Strata Schemes in New South Wales-Proposals
for
Reform" (2006) 13:1 Austl Prop LJ 227 (insisting on paying attention to the social
consequences of a change that facilitates dissolution of strata property).

103

Troy et al, "Strata Termination", supra note 32 at 14.

104 Statistics Canada, Vancouver, CY [Census subdivision], British
Columbia and British

Columbia [Province], Table, Census Profile, 2016Census, Catalogue no 98-316
-X2016001 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2017), online: <wwwl 2.statcan.gc.ca/censusrecensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang-E> (accessed26 October 2017). The
figure is slightly lower-30.5 percent-for the Vancouver [Census metropolitan area]:
Statistics Canada, Vancouver: [Census metropolitan area], Table, Census Profile, 2016
Census, Catalogue no 98-316-X2016001 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2017), online:
<wwwl 2 .statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang-E>
(accessed 26 October 2017). Both figures include households that own and that rent
within condominium, and are well above the national average of 13.3 percent. See
Statistics Canada, "Housing in Canada: Key Results From 2016 Census" (25 October
2017), online: <www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/171025/dql7l025c-eng.htm>.
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property. More than that, in Vancouver amd other cities, where
"gentrification"-"the production of urban space for progressively more
affluent users" 1'-seems too genteel a characterization of the rampant
escalation of land values in recent years, the courts should also be aware that
their rulings have the capacity to exacerbate or to mitigate what is widely
perceived as a crisis of affordability." The fact that Vancouver's housing
stock is among the least affordable of major housing markets in the western
world is a function of factors beyond the rulings ofjudges in strata property
dissolution cases, but the construction of property and its social purposes is
part of this larger story. A jurisprudence that recognizes and considers this
context when it grapples with contested attempts to dissolve strata property
will not only be welcome, but necessary.

105

Jason Hackworth, "Postrecession Gentrification in New York City" (2002) 37:6 Urban

1

Affairs Rev 815 at 815.
See Centre for Public Policy Research, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver' Housing
Affordability Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, Josh C Gordon (Vancouver:
Centre for Public Policy Research, 2 May 2016).

